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I. Pursuing a Double Love
Plato is a notoriously slippery author, but I do not blame his own 
obscurity for making him particularly elusive on the subject of aesthetics. 
Rather, there is something tricky and almost incoherent in the Greek 
approach to value.  A great range of things was deemed to have aesthetic 
value, usually defying our ability to ﬁnd any coherent linking threat. There 
were certain types of things that time and again are numbered among kala, 
among ﬁne or beautiful things. Among them are attractive animate and 
inanimate bodies, objects well adapted to their roles, personal character 
and qualities of character, laws and customs, and knowledge. Much has to 
do with whatever it is that has the potential to inspire us, and whatever it 
may be that has the potential to lead us to those sources of inspiration.
It is regularly assumed that physical beauty in a fellow human being 
is among those things that can have this inspiring effect, and that an 
erotic response to such physical beauty is not strictly separable from one’s 
inner sense of inspiration from it. Similarly, ancient authors often speak 
of an erotic response to things that are quite abstract, such as Pericles’ 
ideals of the democratic city.1 These ideals are founded in the myth of 
the tyrannicide lovers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, whose democratic 
aspirations were inseparably bound up with their aspirations to be each 
other’s.2 A deep attraction to the beauty of another human being goes 
hand in hand with a deep attraction to some still greater public beauty. 
Hence inspiring relationships with another person were seldom thought 
to have no beneﬁcial effects, for the love of beauty emerged in other far 
more valuable ways. Love of visual beauty can, and no doubt should, 
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have some ulterior noble purpose. It may be difﬁcult to appreciate how, 
but somehow the two are linked. 
The Symposium explores this link at many levels, linking pursuit of 
a relationship with pursuit of excellence, pursuit of beauty with the 
opportunity to foster what is good through ‘creation in the beautiful’, and 
pursuit of various types of beauty with the composition of beautiful logoi.3 
But things do not stop there. The Gorgias, for instance, speaks in the same 
breath about Socrates’ love for philosophy and his love for Alcibiades 
(Gorg. 481d)—as well as Callicles’ love for Demos son of Pyrilampes and 
his love of the democratic body of Athens. Why are Plato’s characters 
being credited with having two consuming passions simultaneously? Does 
this not detract from the degree that one may be committed to either? So 
are the Greeks just weaving an intricate web of justiﬁcation for homoerotic 
relationships that they could not ask approval for without their being seen 
to result in other noble passions? Or are they rather on the threshold of 
appreciating something critically important about the nature of human 
desire? Rather than attempt to tackle the mysteries and complexities of 
the Symposium in a short space, I have chosen to examine the connection 
between a loving relationship and higher, more public ambitions in the 
First Alcibiades.
II. Explaining Socrates’ Love for Alcibiades 
The First Alcibiades, hereafter called simply Alcibiades, is a work that 
sets out to document and explain a moment that is important to what 
we term the ‘myth-cycle’ of Socrates. That moment is the philosophic 
seduction of Alcibiades by which he comes to reciprocate Socrates’ erôs. 
This reciprocation is known in the ancient commentators on the work as 
anterôs. I prefer to speak of the original desire as erôs rather than as ‘love’, 
since we are speaking now of a powerful erotic attraction that drives, or 
attempts to drive, the lover into a relationship. It is usually accepted, at 
least within the Platonic corpus, that this erotic desire is wholly or partly 
inspired by one’s detection of beauty within the beloved, whether it 
belongs to the body, the inner person or ‘soul’, or the intellect.
In documenting Alcibiades’ transition from disdain for all lovers 
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to anterôs, starting with the ﬁrst words that the obsessed Socrates will 
address to the young man and concluding with the announcement of a 
philosophic relationship, the dialogue agrees much better than most with 
Aristotle’s requirement of a tragedy at the beginning of chapter 7 of the 
Poetics:4 that it should depict events of a certain magnitude, and that it 
should be complete in the sense of having a deﬁnite beginning, middle, 
and end. If I am right in my supposition that the ancient commentators 
have the key to the correct text and interpretation of a vital passage at 
133c, then there is also a climax at which the real transition takes place. 
And in Aristotelian terms this could be called a peripateia. 
I offer no guarantees about the authenticity of the Alcibiades, which 
is today hotly contested. In fact, in spite of some serious defenders such 
as Annas (1985) and Denyer (2001), I tend to assume that at least some 
of the dialogue,5 and perhaps all, is not written by Plato himself. To me, 
this is no great problem as long as the work stems from Plato’s school 
in the ﬁrst couple of generations after his death. Furthermore, one of the 
reasons why I see an imitator at work here is that the Alcibiades strives to 
situate itself ﬁrmly in the world of Platonic literature, whereas for Plato 
himself the need was rather to situate similar dialogues within the oral 
traditions of Socratic legend.6 The use of Platonic material from other 
dialogues is obvious on virtually every page, and the work repays careful 
study whether or not one believes that one is reading the words of the 
master. Because it is neither without interest nor beyond the boundaries 
of Platonism, the work promises—when correctly understood—to assist 
us with an understanding of the master himself.
At ﬁrst glance, it is scarcely difﬁcult to appreciate why Socrates at the 
beginning of the dialogue is pursuing the youthful Alcibiades. The Charmides 
(154b-c) had spoken of his ﬁnding just about all youths in their prime 
beautiful (and hence attractive), and about the profound effect that great 
beauty could have upon him (cf. 155d-e). The Alcibiades lists Alcibiades’ 
various attractions, giving pride of place to his outstanding beauty and 
height (104a-b), but considering also the nobility, power and wealth of his 
family. Socrates is certainly supposed to be attracted to this physical beauty, 
but the work will argue strongly that he (unlike others) has been attracted 
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rather to Alcibiades’ true self, that is to say to his inner self or soul (131c-e). 
Brieﬂy, Alcibiades’ physical attributes are things that he possesses, not the 
real Alcibiades, therefore the lovers who crave for his body are in love not 
with him, but with what belongs to him. And since his body is already passing 
its prime, its lovers have also lost their enthusiasm. Only Socrates, with his 
keen interest in the inner Alcibiades, has stayed the course, thinking that 
only now is his real beauty coming to fruition. 
It is with this claim to be attracted to the inner Alcibiades that we 
encounter difﬁculties. What is it that Socrates ﬁnds here to be attracted to? 
He would not deny that he is impressed with the young man’s outward 
beauty of which he has plenty of evidence. But what evidence of his 
psychical qualities has he discovered by this stage? He has been observing 
Alcibiades for quite some time, but has never addressed a word to him, 
and the main thing that he had observed was Alcibiades’ haughty attitude 
to his lovers (103b-104c).7 He is even at the receiving end of this at 104d. 
But he has no experience of the youth’s philosophic skills, and nothing in 
the dialogue leads us to believe that any such skills had yet ﬂourished. 
If Socrates had been working with a theory of inherited excellence, 
which certainly does not accord well with other evidence for the Platonic 
Socrates, then Alcibiades might have seemed to offer all the necessary 
attractions. But the Alcibiades itself does not allow us to resort to this 
explanation. Socrates is indeed well aware that the object of his attentions 
comes from a good family, but he suffers from no illusions that this family 
could be a guarantee of qualities of mind or of character, as may easily be 
seen from 118e: his kinsman on his mother’s side, Pericles, was the greatest 
family member, but managed to produce two simpletons for sons, while his 
brother Cleinias was crazy. If it were an aristocratic background that he was 
attracted to then he might equally have been pursuing Cleinias! So why 
is he so impressed with the soul and inner self of this rather unimpressive 
character? Frankly, it is difﬁcult to see how he could consider Alcibiades 
admirable at all, seeing that he diagnoses him with the very worst kind 
of ignorance (118b4-7). And to lack knowledge had for Socrates regularly 
implied a lack of excellence too. What then does Socrates see in this highly 
controversial ﬁgure? 
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It may be part of the answer to observe that Alcibiades has potential 
both for good and for evil. In fact Alcibiades has an amazing amount of 
potential for both. But potential has no aesthetic quality in its own right. 
It may very well be that Socrates has special ability for ensuring that such 
potential is used for the better, but he certainly has no conﬁdence that he 
can counter the corrupting inﬂuence of the democratic masses. Examine 
the following passage:
SOC: This then is the reason [why I only approach you when others have 
stopped] that I alone was your lover, while the rest [were lovers] of your 
assets. Your assets are losing their prime, while you are just beginning to 
blossom. And now, unless you are ruined by the Athenian demos and turn 
out uglier, I shall never abandon you. It’s this, you see, that I’m particularly 
fearful of, that by becoming a demos-lover you’ll be ruined as far as we are 
concerned. (131e10-132a3)
Socrates’ fears are quite explicit (and prophetic), as also at the end of 
the dialogue:
SOC: But I am afraid that the city will overpower you and me, not because 
I doubt your natural ability at all, but because I can see the city’s strength.
Clearly Alcibiades’ potential is recognised, but that potential resides in 
his inner self which is only now beginning to shine, and its development is 
threatened by the very system of government under which he lives. His inner 
self is clearly starting to show some beauty, as suggested by the verb ‘blossom’ 
(anthein), and therefore to attract Socrates, but it also has the potential to turn 
‘ugly’. According to this argument, there is a trace of beauty within that alerts 
one to the beauty that could yet come about, but as far as psychical attractions 
are concerned Alcibiades is not a ravishing young man. We have still failed to 
explain fully Socrates’ erotic feelings towards him.
Let us therefore consider the matter in another way. What quality does 
Alcibiades clearly show at the beginning of the dialogue? The simple 
answer is ambition. Socrates declares that he would not be troubling if 
he thought that Alcibiades would be content with the advantages that 
he already possessed, so it is somehow crucial that Alcibiades wants his 
inﬂuence to grow and grow. His ambitions are on an imperial scale, and 
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he wants fame without limit (104e-105c).8 Socrates declares that he in 
turn hopes for huge inﬂuence by his control of the young man, because his 
assistance is essential if Alcibiades is to achieve his goal. So Socrates, like 
Alcibiades, is in fact aiming for power (megiston dynêsesthai, 105e3; dynamis, 
105e5).9 If all this is serious (and one might suspect that it is modelled on 
the relationship between Aristotle and Alexander),10 then both of them 
have a public goal that is far more important than enjoying a genuine 
private relationship. It seems that their private relationship is second 
to their expectation of power, but power will only come through each 
other.11 This impression, as we shall discover, is potentially misleading in 
the case of Socrates,12 but accurate enough as far as the ambitious young 
Alcibiades is concerned.
Insatiable ambition is not usually considered an attractive inner quality 
today, and put in this way it would not always have been welcomed 
in ancient Greece. But the Greek word for the driving force behind the 
young Alcibiades is philotimia, which, while regularly used for a high 
level of ambition, means literally a love of honour. Such ambition was 
always seen in a positive light in Homer, the most inﬂuential author in 
ancient Greece, and only with great reluctance were values espoused by 
Homer surrendered in the centuries that followed him. So there remains a 
tendency to look upon seemingly excessive ambition as a noble aspiration 
rather than as a disgraceful lust for power. Furthermore, philotimia is a sign 
that one is driven by a powerful desire to win approval—that one cares 
at the very least that one should appear to be of a praiseworthy character. 
The philotimos (honour-loving man) will do everything in his power to 
avoid being subjected to disgraceful criticisms by his fellows. During our 
dialogue Alcibiades is as embarrassed as any at the charges of woeful 
ignorance and premature political activity that are levelled against him. 
This is why he commits so readily (some might say meekly) to Socrates’ 
plans for his further education. So Socrates, knowing that Alcibiades is 
a philotimos, knows also that he will have the tools to shame him into 
developing the skills that will put his ambitions to the best possible use—if 
only the adulation of the masses does not outweigh the criticisms of the 
one intelligent advisor.
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To what extent do Alcibiades’ responses demonstrate his susceptibility 
to being shamed into agreement and a change of course? A great many 
responses are brief and unrevealing, but by 116e2-4 he is obviously less 
self-assured. There are no great protests at the suggestion that he suffers 
from damning ignorance, but he tries to cling to the idea that, through 
Pericles, he has access to the chain of wisdom that Pericles derives from 
his intellectual contacts, until Socrates is able to show that Pericles has not 
been able to hand down this wisdom to any others (118c-9a). Alcibiades is 
by now prepared to examine along with Socrates what it is that he should 
do about his shortcomings (119b), but he takes comfort of a different 
kind from the inferiority of other politicians with whom he will have to 
contend. Socrates eventually persuades him that his real opponents are to 
be found in other states, and that Spartan and Persian kings have a number 
of advantages over his own natural and acquired talents. Only at 124b is 
he convinced that he needs to acquire further skills to achieve the success 
he desires. At ﬁrst Socrates puts the onus upon him to discover what it 
is that he must practice, but further questioning leads him into further 
recognition of his own inability to offer conclusive answers:
ALC: Heavens no, Socrates, I don’t even know what I mean myself, and 
perhaps I have long been failing to notice that I’m in a most disgraceful 
state (aischista echôn). (127d6-8)
This is the first admission by Alcibiades that his condition is a 
shameful one, and, having shamed him, Socrates has to offer some 
words of encouragement: at least Alcibiades has recognised soon enough. 
Alcibiades’ dependence on Socrates’ lead is now more obvious as the 
conversation is diverted back to the key idea of self-knowledge, and the 
nature of the self that we must try to discover. Alcibiades’ cooperation 
is now assured for the rest of the dialogue. It is not that his shame had 
been repeatedly demonstrated, but rather that, once it fully emerges, his 
resistance to the guidance of philosophy (as opposed to his own pre-
conceived ideas) is over.
So we should perhaps allow that Socrates was able to depend on 
Alcibiades’ aspirations to sharpen his sense of shame at exposure through 
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elenchus, and so offer some hope that he would respond to Socratic 
guidance. Not only did Alcibiades have outstanding potential, he also 
had aspirations that ensured his pursuit of what was honourable and 
attractive in preference to what was disgraceful and repellent. There was 
just a little beauty beginning to grow in the inner Alcibiades, scarcely 
enough to warrant great devotion from others, but enough to warrant 
it from one with similarly high aspirations who believed that Alcibiades 
was the key to realising them.
III. Explaining Alcibiades’ Love for Socrates
Socrates’ unappealing physical features are well known, and there 
can be no suggestion that Alcibiades saw in him anything to attract him 
physically. We can rule out any idea that he had seen him as in any way 
attractive before this conversation, since the disdain he felt for his many 
suitors had been universal: he thought he needed no person for any 
purpose (104a1-2). Any attraction towards Socrates had to be explained 
in different terms, and as an attraction to something that only becomes 
evident to him during this conversation. There lies another puzzle, since, 
for most readers, there are several more attractive depictions of Socrates 
within the Platonic corpus than this one. As often, there is an appearance 
of moral expertise that appears largely through the deftness with which 
he handles moral argument, and this is balanced by the common idea that 
he himself is in need of the same studies that interlocutors are (124c1-e1, 
127e5-129b3, 131b). So what is revealed here that is special about Socrates’ 
inner self? 
It is here that the ancient commentator Olympiodorus may help. 
He ﬁnds at 133c, seemingly a climactic point where ancient texts had 
signiﬁcantly different readings, an invitation from Socrates to Alcibiades.13 
Such an invitation is not easily read into our texts, but seems to have been 
clearly implied in Neoplatonic ones. The young man is asked to gaze into 
his lover’s inner person, where he will ﬁnd images of the gods. This is a 
direct allusion to the strange content that the Alcibiades of the Symposium 
(215b3, cf. 216e) finds within Socrates when he is ‘opened up’ like 
Silenus-ﬁgures of a particular type: particularly those of Marsyas. There 
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inside Socrates he had found good sense (sôphrosynê) and arguments that 
contained within ‘very many images of excellence’ (pleista agalmat’ aretês, 
222a4). So, for Olympiodorus, it is the inner beauty that the Symposium’s 
Alcibiades has seen within Socrates and his arguments that is what is now 
winning the young man over to his love in the Alcibiades. The author’s 
general tactic of setting the work ﬁrmly in the traditions of Platonic 
literature, with plausible allusions to numerous other dialogues, makes 
Olympiodorus’ general interpretation seem quite plausible. Alcibiades is 
most likely to be ﬁnding something that is supposed to be hidden beneath 
the unattractive exterior of Socrates’ body and arguments alike. 
There is no doubt that the Symposium is blaming Alcibiades’ vision into 
the interior of Socrates for almost reversing the normal role of lover and 
beloved: after adopting the guise of the lover, Socrates is transformed into 
something more like the object of love (222b3-4). Being akin to a drama 
in which Alcibiades comes to return Socrates’ love, the Alcibiades might 
almost be expected to offer an explanation of anterôs that accorded with the 
Symposium. There will be sources of inspiration that are discovered deep 
within Socrates’ soul and within his arguments. At 133b we learn that, 
just as an eye, in order to discover itself, must look into another eye, and 
into the very part where an eye’s excellence, vision, is to be found, so one 
soul, if it is to know itself, should look into another soul, and particularly 
at that part—the mind—in which the soul’s excellence, wisdom, is found. 
Now the person who most lacks self-knowledge is Alcibiades himself, and 
hence there is a strong implication that he should examine the interior of 
another soul (and no doubt Socrates will be delighted if it is his own soul 
that Alcibiades chooses) for the purpose of seeing his own true self in a 
kind of mirror (cf. 132e2). 
It seems obvious that it is above all Socrates’ mind, the sharpest mind 
of its era, that Alcibiades should be looking into, but 133c1-2 introduces 
another twist by asking whether there is anything more divine (theios) 
within us than the faculty concerned with knowledge and wisdom. A 
negative response brings the observation that this faculty of the soul 
is like god (or like its god),14 and it is here that one should reﬂect upon 
Socrates’ having regularly called the power that controls his divine sign 
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(daimonion) a god (theos) – in this work above all others.15 Socrates’ soul 
seems to have within it a prophetic element that is certainly ‘like a god’. 
A variety of readings could be held to hint at a divine resemblance that is 
particularly true of Socrates’ soul, in which the divine element seems to be 
especially in control.  That would agree well with the notion of something 
like ‘images of the gods’ being present in Socrates’ soul that we ﬁnd in 
the Symposium. 
The philology of all this is extraordinarily difﬁcult, but it is quite 
possible that for the Neoplatonists, with a different text to which they 
were committed, it had been plain enough. Socrates is inviting Alcibiades 
to look into his soul, and to ﬁnd within it both intellect and a god. Their 
relationship will ﬂourish ‘if the god is willing’ (135d6).
On this reading there is no mystery about what it is that Alcibiades 
ﬁnds beautiful in Socrates. Yet the only reason that he is observing Socrates 
to begin with is that he is led to believe that this unexpected inner beauty 
is an image of the beauty that resides in his own innermost self. And the 
only reason that he is now committed to self-discovery is that he has been 
shown that self-knowledge is vital for his enormous political ambitions 
to be realised. His new source of inspiration in a personal friend goes 
hand in hand with that earlier source of inspiration that he has shown 
no signs of giving up permanently. He now recognises the need for 
internal excellence if he is to pass excellence on to the city, and the path 
to achieving that excellence will be far easier with the help of one whose 
soul can provide a paradigm of excellence. The beauty of the goals that 
one hopes to achieve necessitates the creation of a beauty within; and 
for the creation of this inner beauty one needs, and feels the need of, the 
guidance of one who can provide us with a model of the beauty that we 
are to re-establish in ourselves.
IV. Twin Objects of Erotic Attraction
Plato’s puzzling insistence elsewhere that the person whom we think 
we love is not the sole, or even the most important, object of our desire 
seems to be clearly at work in the Alcibiades. That is not to say that there 
is an exact duplication of doctrine from, say, the Lysis (219c-222a) or the 
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Symposium. But Socrates and Alcibiades would not be brought together 
were it not for the fact that both of them are aiming at goals that seem 
extremely high on the scale of beauty or attractiveness. Alcibiades wants 
empire, and to most of those who have not lived in a post-colonialist age 
empire has seemed a glorious thing. Socrates, with a level of seriousness 
that is hard to read, seeks the same level of power, but through his control 
over Alcibiades that comes about from his having a unique ability to allow 
the young man to succeed. 
If Socrates were simply aiming at power as conventionally conceived (and 
as even now conceived by Alcibiades) one would be wondering what 
kind of Platonism this is, since the ‘Socrates’ of the Gorgias (466b-468e) is 
adamant that only power to act justly and do good is really power at all. 
Whatever Socrates is aiming at, one feels, he must be aiming at something 
that he considers to be good; if he wants control, then he must want wise 
control within the conﬁnes of the various virtues. The dialogue strongly 
suggests this, as Socrates is so careful to direct Alcibiades towards fair and 
sensible behaviour at the close (133c-135c), and we may note in particular 
135b3-5:
SOC: So one should not deliver a tyranny, my good Alcibiades, either to 
oneself or to the city, if one is going to be happy (eudaimôn), but excellence 
(aretê).
As far as Socrates is concerned, Alcibiades’ real goal cannot be realised 
apart from excellence, both public and private. This might perhaps have 
been anticipated at 105e4-5:
Nor is anybody else up to delivering the power that you desire, but I alone 
am—with the god’s blessing though.
This is clearly a reference to the very god that has stopped Socrates 
so much as speaking to Alcibiades up until this moment (d5, e7), and the 
providential nature of this controller of the divine sign is consistently 
assumed. There are clear constraints on Socrates’ private ability to inﬂuence 
Alcibiades, for any inﬂuence other than inﬂuence for the good will be 
denied. That simply means that what Socrates is aiming at in seeking 
to control Alcibiades is power to achieve the good. And Socrates at least is 
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aware that his higher love is good. Hence the Gorgias can have him speak 
of his two loves, Alcibiades who vacillates in his beliefs and philosophy 
which always adheres to the same moral views (482a-b). The voice of 
philosophy there may not be unrelated to the ‘daemonic impediment’ 
(103a) of the Alcibiades. 
So Socrates is inspired by noble ideals that inevitably conform with 
goodness, and thus becomes inspired by Alcibiades; Alcibiades is inspired 
by noble ideals whose connection with goodness he is unable to properly 
comprehend. Their high ideals make them prone to act as lovers and to 
feel erotic attraction to whoever is able to ‘make their dreams come true’. 
And that ‘making dreams come true’ is in fact creative activity. As with all 
truly creative activity, it involves the creation of something beautiful and 
well-ordered, whether physical children, poems, scientiﬁc discoveries, or 
law codes.16 Only in the presence of beauty, whether physical or psychical, 
can one’s ability to create such beauty and order come to fruition and 
overﬂow.17 So it does matter that Socrates feels the power of Alcibiades’ 
beauty, particularly those ﬁrst glimmers of inner beauty that are now 
bursting forth. And it matters intensely that Alcibiades should see the inner 
beauty that not only accompanies Socrates but even directs whatever he 
is doing. Socrates and Alcibiades come to each other already inspired by 
beautiful goals, but it is through the recognition of each other’s beauty 
that their creative powers will be unleashed and they will be empowered 
to advance towards a common end. 
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Notes
1  See Th. 2.43.1: mallon tên tês poleôs dunamin kath’ hêmeran ergôi theômenous kai erastas gignomenous 
autês ... 
2  See here Wohl (1999) where most of her ideas that have clear relevance to this paper are already to 
be found; these ideas were reworked and expanded in her (2003).
3  The ﬁrst link is conventional, but associated in particular with Pausanias’ speech (184c3-185c2); 
the second is a central plank of the philosophy of Erôs attributed by Socrates to Diotima (206b7-
e5); the third is a recurrent feature of the ‘Ascent to the Beautiful’ (210a6-8, b6-c3, d3-6). The 
adjective kalos is in the ﬁrst case and the last associated not only with the source of inspiration but 
also with the logoi that are its result (a8, d5), while its absence in the second results from the fact 
that the person loved here may have little physical beauty as opposed to attractive character (b8), 
so that the resultant logoi turn out to be morally improving rather than superﬁcially attractive.
4  I am here grateful to Ian Drummond, who wrote a paper for my University of Toronto seminar on 
the Alcibiades in which he assessed how ‘dramatic’ it was using Aristotle’s conception of drama. 
5  Pamela Clark (1955) is the ﬁrst scholar known to me to have proposed a theory of partial 
authenticity, and that is to be distinguished from Holger Thesleff’s (1982) theory of ‘semi-
authenticity’ that is applied to many shorter dialogues in the corpus. Neither of these theories 
appeals greatly to me in this case. Recent computer-assisted studies of the working vocabulary 
of ‘Socratic’ dialogues, carried out with the assistance of grants from the University of Newcastle 
and the Australian Research Council, have demonstrated to me that the work is fairly consistent 
in its vocabulary mix and barely compatible with universally accepted Platonic dialogues; it is 
usually closer, but not very close, to the other dialogues of tetralogy IV.  
6  The most obvious example of this is to be found in the openings of the Symposium, the Phaedo, and 
the Parmenides.
7  Note hyperblêtheis tôi phronêmati at 103b5, hyperpephronêkas at104a1, mega phronein at c2, and 
megalauchoumenos at c3 for the arrogance.
8  There is an emphasis on crossing into Asia (105c1), and it is implied that Alcibiades is using Cyrus 
(the Great) and Xerxes as models. Later, at 121a-122a and 123b-e the credentials of the Persian 
kings are idealised in greater detail.
9  It may be signiﬁcant that the only cases in this dialogue where the term dynamis occurs in the 
sense of (political) power are 104b4, 105c4, d4, and e5; there is also a suggestive use applied to 
Socrates’ divine sign at 103a6, for that presumably needs to allow Socrates to exercise his dynamis 
over Alcibiades. 
10  The change that came over the interlocutor’s political ideals with a new political order is reﬂected 
not only in this dialogue, but also in the Theages (125e-126a) and the Alcibiades II (141a-c), both of 
them still more serious contenders for the label ‘Pseudo-Platonic’. Attempts have previously been 
made to link the idea of world domination in dialogues of doubtful authenticity with Alexander. 
For discussion see Bailly (2004), 183-5, who is circumspect on this tricky matter. Even so, nothing 
is quite as able to explain young men’s fanciful desire for universal tyranny, if not actual elevation 
to the ranks of the gods, as Alexander’s youthful rise to supreme power and supernatural honour. 
11  It is worth noting that power-relationships between intellectual and potentate are also highlighted 
in Epistle II (particularly 310e5), also of very doubtful authenticity.
12  One should not see Socrates as aiming simply at the rather ugly image of chief advisor to a 
universal potentate; this sounds neither like Socrates the lover, infatuated by the beauty of his 
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beloved, nor like Socrates the philosopher, who is well able to distinguish real power from its 
empty political images (Gorgias 466b).
13  Olymp. in Alc. 271.12-16; for further details see H. Tarrant, ‘Olympiodorus and Proclus on the 
Climax of the Alcibiades’, International Journal for the Platonic Tradition 1 (2007), 3-29.
14  I much prefer ‘god’ (theôi) to ‘divine’ (theiôi), along with the slightly superior manuscript B; the 
precise meaning of  ‘is like’ determines the way we read ‘god’ (whether ‘has a role in it similar to 
a god’s’, or ‘has a role in it similar to god’s role in the universe’).
15  105d5/e5, 124c8, 127e6.
16  See Symposium 209a-e.
17  See Symposium 206c-e.
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